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We investigate the wage-setting behavior of French companies using an ad-hoc survey 
conducted specifically for this study. Our main results are the following. i) Wages are 
changed infrequently. The mean duration of wage contracts is one year. Wage changes 
occur at regular intervals during the year and are concentrated in January and July. ii) 
We find a lower degree of downward real wage rigidity and nominal wage rigidity in 
France compared to the European average. iii) About one third of companies have an 
internal policy to grant wage increases according to inflation. iv) When companies are 
faced adverse shocks, only a partial response is transmitted into prices. Companies also 
adopt cost-cutting strategies. The wage of newly hired employees plays an important 
role in this adjustment. 
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Non-technical summary
This paper investigates the wage-setting behavior of French companies. The features and
determinants of wage setting are crucial since they interact with in￿ ation and they a⁄ect the
monetary policy analysis.
There is a widespread theoretical and empirical literature on wage rigidities but it remains
fragmented. A special line of research consists in exploiting qualitative surveys among ￿rms￿
managers (see Blinder and Choi, 1990) collecting both additional evidence and perceived expla-
nations of wage stickiness. Following Blinder, this paper uses new qualitative information on
wage setting in France based on an original survey conducted among two thousand ￿rms of the
market sector representing approximately 500, 000 employees. This survey has been undertaken
as part of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) and was conducted among a sample of com-
panies usually interviewed for the purpose of the Banque de France monthly Business Survey.
The sectors covered by the sample represent approximately 69% of total GDP. A harmonised
questionnaire was addressed simultaneously in 16 European countries.
We extend the approach proposed by Blinder in several ways. First, the WDN survey is based
on a large and nationally representative sample. Second, it collects additional evidence on wage
setting and variables of the economic and institutional environment where ￿rms operate that are
seldom observed. In particular, data collected help in testing indicators of the strictness of wage
setting institutions or perceived competition from the point of view of ￿rms. The contribution
of this paper is empirical. First, we assess the patterns of wage setting: the frequency and
timing of wage changes, the duration of wage spells. Second, the survey gives insights into the
relative importance of nominal versus real rigidities. We also attempt to establish some of the
reasons for wage rigidity. However, the objective of the paper is broader. It analyses not just
"wage rigidity" but also "adjustment" of ￿rms in the presence of downward wage rigidity. The
adjustment process relates to responses to di⁄erent kinds of adverse shocks including alternative
means: change in prices, output, costs and pro￿t margin.
Our main results are the following. Wages are changed infrequently. The mean duration
of wage contracts is one year. Changes in wages occur at regular intervals during the year
and are concentrated in January and in July. This indicates a time-dependent model of wage6
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changes. As in previous research we ￿nd evidence of the existence of downward wage rigidity.
Our results suggest that the degree of downward real wage rigidity is slightly higher than nominal
wage rigidity in France but lower than the European average. Among explanations advocated
in the literature for wage rigidity, both the fairness and the e⁄ort version of the e¢ ciency
wage hypothesis are important considerations for French ￿rms. Moreover, about one third of
companies have an internal wage-setting policy linking wages to in￿ ation.
When companies faced with adverse shocks, they use mixed strategies combining prices ad-
justment and costs minimization. Only a partial response to economic shocks is transmitted
into prices. Companies also adopt cost-cutting strategies. The WDN survey reports information
about the ￿ exibility resulting from bonuses, wages of the newly hired employees or early retire-
ment. We carry out an econometric analysis based on a quadrivariate probit model. We model
determinants of ￿rms￿reaction to adverse shock jointly to take into account the fact that deci-
sions have been taken simultaneously. Our estimation results point out features of adjustment.
The choice of strategies depends on the degree of competition prevailing on the market where
the companies operate. It also depends on the ￿rm￿ s characteristics: ￿rms with high labor share
are more likely to adjust prices. Large ￿rms in the service sector are less likely to adjust.7
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1 Introduction
The existence and the extent of wage rigidities have crucial implications for monetary policy
analysis. First, a high degree of wage indexing (i.e. real rigidities) can generate a self-sustaining
rise of in￿ ation following a sectoral shock of in￿ ation via second-round e⁄ects. Second, the
extent of nominal rigidities a⁄ects the de￿nition of the in￿ ation target. The downward rigidity
of nominal wages requires a certain level of in￿ ation to allow real wages to adjust to changing
conditions exerting a "grease e⁄ect" on the wheels of the labor market (see Tobin, 1972). More
generally, wage rigidities imply real and persistent e⁄ects of monetary shocks on output (Chris-
tiano et al., 2005). Despite the importance of the issues at stake, there is still no consensus both
on the theoretical mechanisms underlying wage rigidities and on the empirical assessment of the
extent of wage rigidities.
The theoretical literature has identi￿ed di⁄erent mechanisms of wage rigidities (see Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2004) for a comprehensive presentation of wage formation models). A ￿rst
branch focuses on the role of unions and bargaining power in generating rigid wages. In these
models, the rent generated by the ￿rm guarantees insiders￿bargaining power in wage negotia-
tions. In this context, the extent of rigidity is linked to the magnitude of unions￿bargaining
power. The second source of rigidity identi￿ed in the literature stems from the incentive for
managers to pay their employees more than the market-clearing wage. The key assumption of
these models is that high wages make workers more productive. Several versions of the ￿ e¢ -
cient wages￿hypothesis have been formulated including shirking, fairness, turnover and adverse
selection mechanisms. All these models imply downward wage rigidity despite an excess of la-
bor supply. However, empirical studies do not easily allow alternative models supporting the
existence of wage stickiness to be distinguished. Econometric tests of various theories of wage
rigidities fail because of the lack of variables especially designed for the purpose of the analy-
sis. For instance, e¢ cient-wage theories often rely on non-traditional variables for economists
such as fairness, e⁄ort or reciprocity in labor relations. In addition, it is hard to discriminate8
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empirically among theories according to their predictions since they all predict wage rigidity.
The empirics of wage rigidity focus rather on the extent of rigidity than on the causes of
downward rigidity. Most evidence produced on downward wage rigidity has been motivated
by the debate on the appropriate in￿ ation target for central banks (see Akerlof et al., 1996).
Empirical studies typically adopt statistical models of wage change distribution rather than a
structural model inspired by theory. Direct evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity comes
from cross-sectional analysis of the wage changes distribution which almost always shows a
spike at zero and a positive skew (Card and Hyslop, 1997, Lebow et al., 2003). However, this
￿ histogram-location￿approach is subject to measurement errors. Altonji and Devereux (2000)
provide econometric analysis by dealing explicitly with measurement errors and allowing indi-
vidual heterogeneity. The International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP) has recently provided
a uni￿ed framework of analysis for 16 OECD countries. However, results on the extent of wage
rigidities vary a lot according to the country (especially in Europe), the period under review
(especially because of the in￿ uence of the in￿ ation rate) and the data used.
A special line of research consists in exploiting qualitative surveys among ￿rms￿managers
(see Blinder and Choi, 1990) collecting both additional evidence and perceived explanations of
wage stickiness. Blinder￿work has been replicated in the United States and has inspired similar
research in other countries. Campbell and Kamlani (1997) highlighted the practise of e¢ ciency
wage as a factor of wage stickiness for the United States. Bewley (1999) also enhances the
psychological factor of morale to explain downward wage rigidity. This contrasts with European
countries. For instance, Franz and Pfei⁄er (2006) highlight the role of implicit and explicit
contracts in Germany. Agell and Bennmarker (2005), Zoega and Karlssonn (2005) also stress
the importance of legislation on wage formation in Sweden and Iceland.
Previous works on wage rigidities in France were based on quantitative sources (Biscourp et
al., 2005 and Heckel et al., 2008). By contrast, this study uses new qualitative information on
wage setting in France based on an original survey conducted among two thousand ￿rms of the
market sector4 representing approximately 500, 000 employees (see Appendix 1). The survey has
4The WDN survey was conducted among a sample of companies usually interviewed for the purpose of the
Banque de France￿ s monthly Business Survey.9
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been undertaken as part of the Wage Dynamics Network5 (WDN). We extend the methodology
proposed by Blinder in several ways. First, the WDN survey is based on a large and nationally
representative sample. Second, it collects additional evidence on wage setting and information
about the ￿rms￿economic and institutional environment that are seldom observed. In particular,
data collected help in testing indicators of the strictness of wage setting institutions or perceived
competition from the point of view of ￿rms.
The contribution of this paper is empirical. First, we assess patterns of wage setting: the
frequency and timing of wage changes, the duration of wage spells. Second, the WDN Survey
gives insights into the relative importance of nominal versus real rigidities. We also attempt to
establish some of the reasons for wage rigidity. However, the objective of the paper is broader.
It analyses not just ￿wage rigidity￿but also ￿adjustment￿of ￿rms in the presence of downward
wage rigidity. The adjustment process relates to ￿rms￿responses to di⁄erent kinds of adverse
shocks including alternative means: change in prices, output, costs and pro￿t margin.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the survey. Section 3 reviews the main
characteristics of the French wage setting procedures. Sections 4 examines the patterns of wage
setting and section 5 investigates downward wage rigidity. Section 6 is devoted to reactions to
shocks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data description
The Wage Dynamics Network survey is a one-o⁄ survey that aims at investigating wage policies
of human resource managers. The questionnaire refers to the main socio-occupational group
within ￿rm6 (in each ￿rm the main group accounts for 67.9 % of the employees on average).
Thus, this survey strongly di⁄ers from traditional sources (administrative data or household
survey) that collect individual records of wages. Typically, the survey aims at providing answers
in a qualitative way to the following questions: How often do base wages change? Do they tend
to take place in speci￿c months of the year? Respondents were also asked to assess the relevance
5The Wage Dynamics Network involves national central bank of 16 countries in Europe and has been coordi-
nated by the Eurosystem.
6This not includes individualized wage increases.10
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of prices, margins, output, or costs reductions in response to three unanticipated changes in
their business environment: a slowdown in demand, an increase in the cost of an intermediate
input (e.g. an oil price increase), and an increase in wages due to contracts bargained at the
industry level (see Appendix 2 for the complete questionnaire).
The use of ￿ stated-preference￿ 7 data to investigate companies￿wage setting behavior has
several advantages for our purpose. First, ad-hoc surveys allow to collect information on variables
of interest that are seldom available such as perceived reasons of downward wage rigidity or
response to shocks. Moreover, the survey is more likely to provide relevant information on how
￿rms deal with laws or institutions than objective data (e.g. national indicators of bargaining
coverage). Second, direct questioning may help for the econometric issue of identi￿cation of
idiosyncratic shocks. By asking ￿rms how they respond to shocks, there is no need to identify
the shocks themselves. Finally, as both the sampling frame and the concept of wages are similar
across countries participating in the WDN project, our data makes possible fully homogeneous
comparisons between numerous European countries8.
There are, of course, limitations to the data we use. This ad-hoc survey is cross-sectional
by nature. The lack of time dimension does not allow us to test the sensitivity to the business
cycle or to check whether wage setting behavior changes over time. Moreover, some questions
might be misunderstood because they do not match the speci￿c context of the ￿rm. Furthermore,
responses also have to be treated with caution because the person who ￿lled in the questionnaire
might not be aware of the entire wage-setting process especially in large ￿rms (e.g. pro￿t
scheme). However, international comparisons (Druant et al., 2008) exhibit robust stylised facts
7In numerous questions of the WDN survey (response to shocks, deviation from the on going wage, etc.), the
respondent is asked to state which options he would choose. ￿ Stated-preference￿data contrasts with ￿ revealed-
preference￿data that relates to people actual choices in real situations.
8Cross-countries studies exploiting the European harmonized sample are already available: Fabi-
ani et al. (2008) examine linkings between wages and prices decisions, Babecky et al. (2008) as-
sess downward nominal rigidities, Bertola et al. (2008) investigate the wages response to shocks,
Galusak et al. (2008) focus on the issue of new hires wages. These studies are available at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/conferences/html/wage_dynamics_network.en.html. Similar surveys, using
the WDN questionnaire, have also been conducted in Japan (see Ariga and Kamabayashi, 2008) and in Canada
(see Amirault, Fenton and La￿ Łche, 2007).11
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across countries. Wage setting characteristics such as the frequency of wage change is shown not
to be very di⁄erent across European countries. Thus, WDN surveys represent a complementary
data set and a useful crosscheck of the evidence obtained from quantitative sources.
Respondents were asked to provide information on the way they behave under ￿normal
conditions and practises￿ . Quantitative information relates to the previous accounting year.
Thus, their responses depend, among other things, on the economic situation in France at
the time the survey was conducted. It took place in an environment characterized by high
unemployment and low in￿ ation. The unemployment rate (7.9 %) has been on a downward trend
since mid-2004 but it still remains higher than the European average. In 2007, the consumer
price index grew at a rate of two percent, broadly stable compared to the preceding year.
Economic growth in the ￿rst half of 2007 was in line with potential output. In addition, Table 1
gives a general picture of company characteristics in the sample. Hiring and ￿ring are positively
correlated across sectors and appear to be lower in the manufacturing sector and in larger
companies. Also, companies hire employees mostly on ￿xed-term contracts or have recourse
to temporary work. However, the number of these contracts remains limited (10 % of the
national workforce). The vast majority (more than 90%) of contracts are permanent full-time
ones. Due to the sample composition, manual workers are still over-represented and clerical
under-represented compared to the entire workforce. Firms participating in the survey sell
their products mainly in France, the manufacturing sector being the most open to international
competition.
[TABLE 1: Company characteristics]
3 Wage setting procedures in France: an overview
In this section, we review the wage setting procedures to allow a better understanding of the
empirical pattern of wage dynamics. Like in many countries in continental Europe, wage bar-
gaining occurs at two levels. First, wages are de￿ned by a multi-employer agreement (between
employer associations and union or employee representatives). In addition, agreements might12
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be improved by single-employer agreements at the company level9. Furthermore, the govern-
ment indirectly intervenes via extension mechanisms of collective agreements (at the request
of employers or unions). The Auroux law (1982) also requires annual negotiations both at the
company and the industry level.
At the industry level, employers have collectively to bargain wage rates when there are union
representatives within the company. All companies are therefore not obligated to negotiate on
wages but most are covered by an industry agreement. These agreements typically specify the
wage scale for di⁄erent tenure levels for a range of di⁄erent job categories. At the bottom of
the wage scale, the minimum wage, equally applies to every industry and thus constitutes a
national wage ￿ oor. To ensure fair competition, industry level agreements may be extended to
all companies belonging to the sector after a governmental decision.
At the company level, initiating annual negotiations is compulsory but the ￿ social partners￿
are not obliged to reach an agreement. A ￿rm-level agreement almost always improves the
situation of employees in relation to the industry level agreement in force. If negotiations fail
(in 20% of cases), the existing pay structure remains applicable. Overall, 98 % of ￿rms of the
sample are covered by collective agreements (either negotiated at the company or the industry-
level) although union membership is lower than 10% of the workforce. There can be signi￿cant
di⁄erences of coverage between sectors, size and geographical areas.
[TABLE 2: Collective agreements]
Collective agreements might shape wage setting rules (see Section 4.3). Avouyi-Dovi et al.
(2007) show that there is a strong seasonality in the wage bargaining rounds: 50 % of wage
agreements are signed during the ￿rst month of the year. The duration of a collective agreement
is typically 12 months. Occasionally, employers and employees￿representatives ￿nd an agreement
for a period of 24 months. Most agreements are strongly driven by developments in the price
index. A majority of European countries share these characteristics (Du Caju et al., 2008).
However, agreements at industry level are not systematically binding and companies also
have speci￿c wage policies. Results taken from the survey indicate that wages are actually paid
9In France, escape clause exists since 2005 but they are rarely used by ￿rms.13
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higher than negotiated wages in nearly half of the ￿rms. These ￿gures are broadly equivalent to
those observed in Belgium for which this information is available (see Druant et al., 2008). The
magnitude of the wage drift is also comparable with estimates on Spain based on a structural
model (see Palenzuela and Jimeno, 1996). According to the WDN survey data, e⁄ective wages
exceed tari⁄wages by about 6.5% (see Table 2). The size of the gap shed light on the respective
role of industry and ￿rm negotiation. The wage drift tend to be higher in larger ￿rms and in
business services. This so-called ￿ wage drift￿is likely to happen in heterogeneous sectors where
sectoral bargained wages are low. Moreover, it can be in the interest of the ￿rms to pay workers
above the going rate set in the agreement. First, it might re￿ ect pay policies by ￿rm. One can
argue it ampli￿es the e⁄ect of workers￿characteristics on wages as assumed in e¢ cient wage
theories especially in business services. Second, it could also re￿ ect unions￿wage premium and
rent sharing especially in large ￿rms. Third, the gap between e⁄ective wages and tari⁄ wages
can be used to bu⁄er possible and unwanted collective wage agreement since it allows employers
to counterbalance increasing tari⁄ wages. Then it can be interpreted as a short-term margin of
￿ exibility for ￿rms inside an industry coordinated wage bargaining system, noticeably for wages
of newly hired employees. In this respect, a study panel data in Portugal also shows that the
wage drift is contra-cyclical while wages are procyclical (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005).
4 Patterns of wage setting
In this section, we aim at characterising the empirical wage-setting rules. In this context, there
are three elements of particular relevance: the frequency and the timing of wage changes and
the duration of wage spells.
4.1 Frequency of wage changes
In the survey, ￿rms had to indicate the number of times they change their wages in a given
year. Wages are found to be relatively rigid in the sense they are changed every year. 74% of14
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companies change wages once a year10 (see Table 3). Nearly 20% of companies indicate they
change the base wage more than once a year. The fraction of ￿rms who do not change wages
is negligible. These results are consistent with Biscourp et al. (2005) who obtain a frequency
of annual wage changes equal to 89%. Frequency of wage changes varies across sectors. For
instance, wages change more frequently in the trade sector. Wage changes are less frequent in
services than in manufacturing. In personal services, wage changes occur almost always once a
year. Regarding size, the frequency is higher for large ￿rms.
[TABLE 3: Wage change frequency]
4.2 Wage spells duration
We also provide an approximation of the average implicit duration of wage contracts. The
average implicit duration can be computed as the inverse of frequency11. This approach makes
it possible to compute durations without using individual records and without treatment of
censoring. In Table 4, the mean wage spell is expressed in months. Wages are considered as
rigid as the duration between two changes is long. We also document low heterogeneity of wage
spells across industry and company size. Overall, the average duration of a wage contract is
found to be one year. These results have to be considered as proxies since they depend crucially
on ad-hoc assumptions. Moreover, they di⁄er from results obtained by Heckel et al. (2008) who
￿nd a mean duration of two quarters. However, the methodology di⁄ers: we provide implied
average duration across ￿rms whereas Heckel et al. (2008) compute direct duration across wage
contracts. Moreover, our sources are not fully comparable. The WDN survey only captures
"deliberate" changes whereas predetermination is a relevant feature of wage changes: i.e. the
10Frequency is a synthetic variable based on three variables of the questionnaire: changes due to tenure, changes
due to in￿ ation and ￿ independent changes￿ .
11In the context of the WDN survey, answers de￿ne frequencies of wage changes (see Appendix 2). Most
answers translate directly into durations (e.g. once a year translates into duration of one year). However, others
answers de￿ne intervals. To translate intervals into a point, we assume that frequencies of wage changes are
uniformly distributed across the interval (e.g. "less frequently than a year" is translated into 2 changes per year).
Moreover, we also assume a truncation for inde￿nite intervals: "less frequently than once every two years" is
bound to 0.4 change per year.15
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fact that contracts may include preset wage increases. In particular, while wage changes are
implemented on average every two quarters, decisions on wage changes are actually less frequent.
[TABLE 4: Wage spells duration]
4.3 Timing of wage changes
We now investigate the dynamics of wage setting. A heuristic distinction is traditionally made
between state-dependent and time-dependent wage setting rules. First, there is state-dependence
wage setting when companies change wages as a result of a large change in economic conditions.
A standard justi￿cation for this type of adjustment is the prevalence of adjustment costs (in the
wage setting context it might be the cost of opening a negotiation). Thus, ￿rms following state-
dependence rules change wages in response to shocks. Second, time-dependence wage setting
applies when companies change wages on a periodic basis. The time interval of the nominal
contracts is often modelled e.g. by Taylor (1980) as ￿xed. Workers sign contracts that specify
a ￿xed wage for several periods. The current generation of macro models also refers to Calvo-
type contracts where the duration between two changes is random. Note that these state and
time-dependent rules are not mutually exclusive. For instance, a mix of state-dependence and
time-dependence is a common ￿nding of price setting. Firms seem to change wages each year if
their economic environment is stable but might renegotiate contracts in the presence of shocks
(see Section 6). More generally, Olivei and Tenreyro (2008) show that real e⁄ects of monetary
shocks depend on the timing of shocks. Using data from the U.S., Japan, Germany, U.K. and
France, they argue that the quicker the transmission, the more synchronized wages change across
￿rms.
[FIGURE 1: Timing of wage changes]
Figure 1 plots the timing of wage changes by month. We ￿nd a strong seasonal pattern
of wage change decisions. Indeed, 58% of ￿rms change base wages in January or in July.
Overall, 78% of companies change wages in a particular month of the year. There is a clear
synchronization in wage changes. However, it is di¢ cult to determine whether this pattern16
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provides evidence for state-dependence behavior (in response to the numerous price changes
observed in January) or whether it re￿ ects time-dependence due to institutional factors. The
"January e⁄ect" might be due in large part to collective bargaining rounds which take place at
the beginning of the year (see Section 3). The "July e⁄ect" also results from the minimum wage
increase. Another way to assess time-dependency is to determine whether the probability of a
wage change is likely to be a⁄ected by the duration since the last wage change. Estimates of
the wage change probability show it increases substantially at durations of 12 and 24 months,
thus indicating that a fraction of companies change their wages each year or every two years
(Gottschalk, 2005 for the U.S and see Heckel et al., 2008 for France).
5 Downward wage rigidity
In this section, we provide new evidence on the extent of downward wage rigidity. Standard
measures of wage rigidities in the literature are based on year to year wage changes distributions
of the same employees (see Kramarz, 2001 for a survey). Downward nominal wage rigidity
(DNWR), that is resistance to cut nominal wages, is usually identi￿ed by the extent of the
spike at zero on the histogram of wage changes (i.e. the number of individual wages that
remains unchanged). Downward real wage rigidity (DWRW), that is resistance to cut real
wages, is measured by the spike at the rate of in￿ ation. Moreover asymmetries around zero
are also considered as evidence of downward wage rigidity. However, the great majority of
studies which intend to measure downward wage rigidity conclude that measurement errors are
a serious problem (see e.g. Altonji and Devereux, 2000). The use of administrative datasets
makes it di¢ cult to properly identify base wage because of the inclusion of overtime hours and
bonuses. If base wage levels are measured with errors, this leads to spurious wage changes that
may wrongly be interpreted as wage ￿ exibility. Furthermore, the use of household surveys may
lead to an overestimation of wage rigidity since rounding e⁄ects bias wage change toward zero.
Changes in working conditions (e.g. a shift from a full-time job to a part-time status or a shift
from night work to day work) may also add noise to the data.17
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5.1 Measuring downward nominal and real wage rigidity
WDN surveys avoid these methodological pitfalls. We take advantage of the fact that human
resources managers are directly questioned on their wage policies. We indeed measure deliberate
wage changes that are indicated by respondents. Downward nominal wage rigidity is computed
as the share of nominal wage freezes. The WDN survey does not include a direct proxy of
downward real wage rigidity. As Babeck￿ et al. (2008), we de￿ne it as the proportion of ￿rms
linking wages to in￿ ation. This includes ￿rms that are constrained from adjusting real wages
not only downward but also upward. Table 5 presents some summary statistics on the extent of
DNWR and DRWR. We ￿nd real wage rigidity to be slightly higher than nominal wage rigidity
in France (respectively 10.0% and 8.8%). Cross-county comparisons indicate a lower degree of
rigidity in France than in the Euro Area where DRWR is found to be 20,3% and DNWR 9.3%
(see Fagan et al., 2008). The same hierarchy is obtained with the use of the IWFP protocol (see
Dickens et al., 2007)12. There are modest di⁄erences of the extent of wage rigidity across sectors
in France. One13 exception is real wage rigidity in the trade sector due to the high share of
people paid to the minimum wage. However, there is a considerable variation across European
countries in the extent of downward wage rigidity (see Fagan et al., 2008). As argued by Messina
et al. (2008), this suggests that labor market institutions rather than technology are a source
of heterogeneity of wage rigidity among European countries.
[TABLE 5: Downward nominal and real rigidities]
WDN survey data also show that base wage cuts do occur: 2.5 % of companies say they
have used base wage cuts at least once in the past ￿ve years. Wage cuts are more frequent in
the manufacturing sector. The data con￿rm the existence of downward adjustments in extreme
cases. Managers are more likely to cut wages if the ￿rm faces extreme ￿nancial di¢ culties or if
jobs are at stake. Moreover, according to respondents these wage cuts a⁄ect 70% of employees
12Results of the WDN and IWFP are not comparable because the unit (￿rms vs. employees) and the type of
data (cross-section vs. panel) are di⁄erent.
13Because of the low response rate, results in the personal services sector are not statistically di⁄erent from
others sectors.18
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within a company but not all. This contrasts with Bewley (1999) who argued that reductions
are made in order to preserve the pay di⁄erentials required by the pay structure.
5.2 Wage indexation
Wage indexation directly a⁄ects downward wage rigidity. The degree of indexation is embedded
in the labor market institutions. According to the law14, employment contracts in France do
not have to automatically tie wages to a cost-of-living index with the exception of the minimum
wage15. According to Koubi and Lhommeau (2006), the spillover e⁄ect of the minimum wage
increase is on average 30% at the bottom of the wage scale with a high dispersion across sectors.
The existence of a minimum wage implies that real wages become more rigid as in￿ ation rate
goes to zero.
The WDN survey provide information on both formal indexation at the minimum wage and
informal practice of indexation (for instance at each round of collective bargaining). Results
show that about one third of companies say they practise informal indexing. 22.4% of ￿rms
say they adopt backward-looking behavior and index their wages to past in￿ ation (see Table
6). 9.3% of ￿rms adjust wages on expected in￿ ation. However, the survey was conducted in
an environment of in￿ ation close to 2%. It therefore does not re￿ ect any change in behavior
associated with rising in￿ ation. In the presence of in￿ ationary pressures, wage pressures could
be intensi￿ed which in turn could increase the degree of wage indexation to in￿ ation.
[TABLE 6: Wage indexation]
5.3 Perceived reasons for wage stickiness
We also assess potential reasons for wage rigidity. Evidence on this issue is rather scarce and
dispersed. Direct information can be obtained from the WDN survey. It contains a question
which directly addresses the reasons for wage stickiness (see Appendix 2). Possible answers to
14Article L112-2, Code monØtaire et ￿nancier
15 The minimum wage is adjusted each July by a automatic indexation on the cost of living and half from
increased purchasing power of average wage worker. Moreover companies have incentive to increase wages at the
bottom of the wage scale in order to maintain wage hierarchy.19
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this question include a list of statements addressed in simple terms based on sources of rigidities
arising from institutional restrictions, insurance provision, relative wages (when taking wage
decisions ￿rms take into account wage rates set in other ￿rms) and e¢ ciency wage hypothesis.
Four versions of the e¢ ciency wage theory are detailed: the ￿rst one holds that high wages reduce
labor turnover. A second e¢ ciency-wage theory holds that the average quality of a ￿rm￿ s work
force depends on the wage it pays its employees. The third and fourth versions of e¢ ciency-wage
theory hold that high wages increase workers￿e⁄ort and (respectively) reciprocity. Company
responses have been converted into numerical scores ranging from 1 to 4 using the same coding
scheme as that proposed by Blinder et al. (1998) in their study of price rigidity. Above 2.5, the
score is considered as reasonably strong and an average above 3.0 as very strong. Table 7 ranks
theories by mean scores.
[TABLE 7: Rating of theories explaining wage stickiness]
Data suggest that both the fairness and the shirking version of the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis
are supported. Overall, companies are reluctant to adjust wages. The survey results also indicate
that lower wages would not be an incentive and this could lead to lower the productivity by
employees. The main reasons for the deviations from the going rate appear to be employer-
related, even in ￿rms in which all workers are covered by collective agreements. We emphasize
mechanisms of wage rigidity at the establishment-level. When faced with shocks, ￿rms use
alternative ways to adjust.
6 Adjustment in the presence of wage rigidity
In the presence of downward of rigidity, the WDN survey provides information on ￿rm￿ s adjust-
ment. Respondents were asked to assess the relevance of the following adjustments margins: an
increase in prices, a reduction in pro￿t margins, a reduction in output and a reduction in costs.
By asking ￿rms how they respond to shocks, there is no need to identify the shocks themselves.
The WDN survey questions specify three hypothetical shock scenarios: a slowdown in demand,
an increase in intermediate costs (e.g. an oil price increase) and a permanent rise in wages (for20
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instance due to contracts bargained at the industry level). All these three shocks are considered
as unexpected and common to all ￿rms. We provide evidence on how ￿rms react to shocks and
distinguish di⁄erent margins of adjustment.
6.1 Responses to shocks
Table 8 shows that companies use mixed strategies when faced with shocks combining price
adjustment and cost minimization. The chosen margins of adjustments di⁄er according to the
type of shock. Companies reduce costs primarily when they are facing with a demand shock
and increase prices when faced with supply shocks. Cost reduction is an important strategy for
approximately 75 % of the respondents after a demand shock. On the contrary, price adjustment
is an important strategy for around 55% of the respondents after a supply shock. However, we
do not ￿nd any sign of the potential price vs. quantity adjustment dichotomy (see Andersen
and Toulemonde, 2004).
[TABLE 8: Economic shocks and margins of adjustment]
We try to determine which factors increase the probability to change price, margin, output
and cost. Three kinds of explanations are considered: the degree of market competition, the type
of collective agreements and the technology of the ￿rm. We use a measure of perceived compe-
tition at the ￿rm level. Both ￿rm-level and industry-level collective agreements are considered.
Labor intensity identi￿es the technology of the ￿rm. A set of control variables captures features
of the ￿rm￿ s strategies: industry dummies to control for di⁄erences in technology, geographical
area, composition of the work force. We model determinants of ￿rms￿reaction to adverse shock
jointly. We use a quadrivariate probit model to take into account the fact that decisions have
been taken simultaneously. To allow for the possibility that choices are related to unobserved
factors, errors terms are correlated. The equations for this model have the following form:




1 if X￿ + "1 > 0
0 otherwise21
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1 if Z￿ + "2 > 0
0 otherwise




1 if W￿ + "3 > 0
0 otherwise




1 if V ￿ + "4 > 0
0 otherwise
We assume that the error terms are distributed as a quatrivariate normal distribution
("1;"2;"3;"4) ! N4(0;￿), where ￿ has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations





￿4(￿i;￿) is the quadrivariate normal cdf where ￿i = (q1X￿;q2Z￿;q3W￿;q4V ￿) ; ￿ has
elements ￿jj = 1 and ￿jk = qjqk￿jk for j;k = 1;:::;4. The 0signs0 variables (qk = 2yk ￿ 1)
being equal to 1 and ￿1 depending on whether the observed binary outcome equals 1 or 0 for
k = 1;:::;4.
The likelihood function requires evaluation of quadrivariate normal distribution. For high
dimension of the multivariate normal distribution, simulation-based methods are required. Here,
we use simulated ML based on the ￿ GHK￿simulator. The GHK simulator exploits the fact that
a multivariate normal distribution can be expressed as the product of sequential condititioned
univariate normal distributions. The simulated probabilities are plugged into the likelihood at
each iteration of the maximisation. Table 9 reports multivariate probit estimations. The ￿rst
column gives the likelihood of the respective reaction after a demand shock, the second and
third columns refer to the response after an increase in the cost of an intermediate input or the
labor cost.
[TABLE 9: Multivariate probit estimates]22
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The nature of the response might depend on the characteristics of the ￿rm (size, sector, area)
and the conditions external to the ￿rm (wage bargaining system, competition and technology).
The intensity of competition ampli￿es company responses. Our empirical results show that
stronger competition is associated with more intensive adjustment in the aftermath of shocks.
Price increases (decreases) after supply (demand) shocks are less (more) likely when competition
in the product market is strong. Higher labour cost share lowers the likelihood of price increases
after a shock. Since a higher labour share implies that marginal costs are more sensitive to labour
costs, prices are more likely to be raised in response to a general wage increase. This is also
consistent with the results on price determinants within the In￿ ation Persistence Network (see
Loupias and Ricart, 2006, Loupias and Sevestre, 2008). Our results also suggest that collective
bargaining at sectoral level does not have a signi￿cant impact on the probability that ￿rms will
adjust. There is a clear sectoral e⁄ect indicating that compared to the manufacturing sector,
￿rms operating in the market services sector are less likely to adjust. We also ￿nd that large
￿rms are less likely to adjust. However, there might be a strong interaction of demand shocks
and the degree of competition. Competition makes prices react more to demand changes than
to costs changes. Finally, the error terms are found to be signi￿cantly correlated.
6.2 International comparison
An important question is whether the di⁄erence in response to shocks across countries might be
explained by the di⁄erences between job market institutions. In a study involving the twelve
European countries participating in the WDN survey, Bertola et al. (2008) ￿nd evidence of
important institutional in￿ uences on company-level responses to all types of shocks. Collective
pay agreements bargained outside the ￿rm increase the probability that ￿rms cut costs by laying
o⁄ workers, while employment protection legislation increases the likelihood that ￿rms reduce
wages. The e⁄ect of collective agreement is more prevalent when we use the European dataset
(due to heterogeneity) than in a single country case (see above). Across Euro area countries,
more stringent employment protection is associated with a lower probability of employment
reduction in response to a shock. Countries with rather stringent employment protection, which
is the case of France, tend to smooth permanent employment adjustment, while increasing the23
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responsiveness of hours adjustment and (less clearly) of temporary employment.
6.3 Wages of new hires
In the presence of downward wage rigidity ￿rms have other ways to adjust labor costs. Surveyed
￿rms were asked whether they have ever used other adjustment mechanisms to reduce labor
cost. These mechanisms include the hiring of new employees at a lower wage level than ongoing
wages, slowing down the rate at which promotions are ￿lled or reducing bonuses and non-pay
bene￿ts. Evidence in the literature on wages of new hires show procyclicality of real wages (more
than job stayers) in the US (see Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991) ; this is true both for workers
moving from job to job and for those moving from unemployment to job (see Bils, 1985). In
the UK, Germany and Italy, there is no evidence that wages of movers are more pro-cyclical
than wages of stayers (see Peng and Siebert, 2007). On the contrary, Carneiro et al. (2008) ￿nd
a signi￿cant wage cyclicality of new hires taking into account ￿rm and employees unobserved
heterogeneity in Portugal. Evidence is scarce on this issue in France. Traditional interpretation
of wage movers stress a cyclical composition e⁄ect of jobs: during recessions ￿rms hire more
skilled workers than during booms. It also relies on inter-industry wage di⁄erentials. If these
sectors are cyclically sensitive, workers can switch into high-paying jobs during booms. More
recent interpretation insists on a ￿ cyclical within ￿rm￿e⁄ect according to which is wages of new
hires are more ￿ exible than wages of existing employees (see Pissarides, 2009). The WDN survey
provides direct evidence on the main occupational group within ￿rm.
In response to idiosyncratic shocks, half of the companies say that new employees are hired
with lower wages. However, under normal circumstances, wages of new hires are determined
largely by pay scale. In this context, deviations from the going rate are not very common.
The survey also shows that the wages of new hires remain determined by the pay scale within
companies. Recruiter tries to understand how new hires ￿t into the wage scale given their
training experience, skills and job. As pointed by Bewley (1999), pay scales allow to guarantee
fairness among employees (as suggested in Section 5).24
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7 Conclusion
Using a source of a qualitative nature, this study highlights several characteristics of wage
setting in France. First, a vast majority of companies change wages each year. Changes in
wages occur at regular intervals during the year and are concentrated in January and in July.
The timing of negotiation and the degree of synchronisation of wage changes indeed matters for
the transmission of monetary policy.
As in previous researches, we ￿nd evidence of the existence of downward wage rigidity. Our
results suggest that downward real wage rigidity is slightly higher than nominal wage rigidity in
France but lower than the European average. Among explanations advocated in the literature
for wage rigidity, both the fairness and the e⁄ort version of the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis are
important considerations for French ￿rms.
About one third of companies have an internal wage-setting policy linking wages to in￿ a-
tion. When companies faced with adverse shocks, they use mixed strategies combining prices
adjustment and costs minimization. Only a partial response to economic shocks is transmitted
into prices. Companies generally adopt cost-cutting strategies. In the presence of downward
base wage rigidity, companies use di⁄erent strategies such as reductions in bonuses or wages of
new hires and early retirement schemes. The choice of strategies depends on the ￿rms￿charac-
teristics. Large ￿rms in the service sector are less likely to adjust. The wage of new hires also
plays an important role in this adjustment.
A number of questions for future work remain open. First, do these results remain unchanged
in a context of rising in￿ ation? Another key question is to know how asymmetry of shocks matters
as the questionnaire focuses on adverse shocks.25
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Appendix 1: Description of the survey
The WDN survey that was carried out during the fall of 2007 is an ad-hoc survey. The
questionnaire cover among other topics wage changes, adjustment to shocks, and adjustment to
in￿ ation.
Scope of the survey
The WDN survey was conducted among a sample of companies usually interviewed for the
purpose of the Banque de France monthly Business Survey. It was carried out in close col-
laboration with the Banque de France￿ s branches. The survey covers companies with at least
5 employees and whose economic activity belong to the sectors C to K of the classi￿cation of
activities of the European Community (manufacturing, trade, hotels and restaurants, market
services) in France. The sectors covered by the sample represent approximately 69% of total
GDP. The survey focuses on employees and excludes apprentices and trainees. The sample does
not include the civil servants and self-employed. A harmonized survey was conducted simulta-
neously in 16 European countries. Some speci￿c questions were added to the core questionnaire
concerning wage drift and in order to take into account some institutional speci￿cities.
The data collected relate to the year 2007. The questionnaire focuses, unless otherwise
stated, on the base wage excluding overtime pay and bonuses. Questions relative to the ￿rms￿
wage policy are mostly qualitative. The survey also collects information about the ￿rm, on the
￿ ows of entries and exits of employees within ￿rms. Companies were mainly interviewed by mail
and electronic mail but also by face to face or telephone interviews.
Survey methodology
The basic statistical unit is the ￿rm. Groups are not interviewed as such, the results are
not consolidated. 6645 ￿rms were interviewed. The questionnaire was mainly ￿lled by business
managers (CEO, CFO or human resource manager). The response rate is around 31% that
is lower than conventional ￿rm surveys or business surveys but usual for that kind of ad-hoc
surveys. There is also little evidence of sample selection bias. Detail of response rate by sector,
size and geographical area are presented in Table A.
[TABLE A The sample]31
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The descriptive results are weighted. For a given ￿rm, weights indicate the number of
workers in relation to the total population, taking into account the ￿rm￿ s size and sector. The
weight is de￿ned as the sum of all employees in the stratum divided by the number of ￿rms
in that stratum. The sample is divided into 20 strata according to the sector and the number
of employees. The weights were derived from FIBEN database. The sample weights take no
account of the classi￿cation of the employees according to the occupational status.32
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Appendix 2 : Questionnaire 33
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Collective agreement Firm-specific Wage drift*
Firms wage policy
Total 97.9 46.0 6.5
By sector
Manufacturing 98.5 50.5 5.7
Trade 99.2 47.7 4.7
Business services 97.3 43.1 7.4
Personal services 98.4 1.6 1.0
By size
0-19 employees 96.4 28.8 5.6
20-49 employees 96.7 43.1 5.3
50-199 employees 98.7 42.0 5.4
>200 employees 98.1 50.6 7.1
*Wage dift = "effective" wage -
"bargained" wage (in level)
Table 2 - Collective agreements (percentages)
 
More frequently Yearly Less frequently Never
than once a year than once a year
Total 19.5 74.3 5.2 1.1
Manufacturing 23.7 71.8 3.9 0.6
Trade 28.4 53.6 12.1 5.8
Business services 15.6 77.4 5.8 1.2
Personal services 0.0 93.5 6.5 0.0
0-19 employees 12.8 66.0 17.9 3.3
20-49 employees 13.6 76.7 8.8 0.9
50-199 employees 20.3 72.2 6.3 1.2
>200 employees 21.5 75.6 2.1 0.7
Table 3 - Frequency of wage changes (percentages)42
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Mean Number of 
Duration observations
Total 11.9 2 029
Manufacturing 11.3 1 295
Trade 13.7 63
Market services 12.2 653
Non-market services 13.0 18
0-19 employees 14.7 281
20-49 employees 12.7 396
50-199 employees 12.0 764
>200 employees 11.2 588





Business services 8.3 9.9
Personal services 8.3 1.2
Table 5   - Downward nominal and real wage rigidity (percentages)43
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Link to past inflation  Link to expected inflation  Wage indexation
Total 22.4 9.3 31.7
Manufacturing 27.0 11.2 38.2
Trade 28.9 2.3 31.2
Business services 18.5 8.4 26.8
Personal services 1.6 1.6 3.2
Table 6 - Wage indexation (percentages)




Explicit contract 3.1 2.9
Adverse selection 3.1 3.3
Negative signal 2.7 2.8
Reputation 2.5 2.6
Relative wages 2.2 2.6
Turnover 2.1 2.8
Implicit contract 1.6 2.4
* Excluding Germany and Greece44
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1102
October 2009
Adjustment strategy After a cost-push shock After a wage shock After a demand shock
Percent Percent Percent
Price/Costs 20.4 1.0 3.2
Increase price 14.1 17.3 0.3
Price/Margin/Costs 12.4 0.3 12.7
Margin/Costs 10.5 0.4 8.9
Reduce costs 10.3 0.3 15.0
Price/Margin 4.7 5.6 4.4
Reduce margin 4.4 5.1 2.2
Price/Margin/Output/Costs 2.1 2.2 9.1
Margin/Output/Costs 1.9 0.9 5.5
Price/Output/Costs 1.5 1.6 2.2
Output/Costs 1.2 1.2 18.5
Price/Output 0.3 15.3 0.2
Price/Margin/Output 0.3 12.2 2.0
Reduce Output 0.2 10.6 3.3
Margin/Output 0.1 9.9 1.3
None 15.7 16.2 11.2
Table 8 - Adjustement strategies (percentages)45
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Cost shock Labor cost shock
Coeff. Rob. std. Coeff. Rob. std. Coeff. Rob. std.
Price adjustment equation
(price decrease for demand shock) Fierce competition ref. ref. ref.
(price increase for supply shock) Strong competition -0,33 *** 0,12 0,29 ** 0,12 0,35 *** 0,12
Weak competition -1,09 *** 0,13 0,47 *** 0,13 0,58 *** 0,13
No competition -1,67 *** 0,25 0,21 0,21 0,00 0,21
Collective agreement, industry level 0,35 0,30 -0,18 0,39 -0,23 0,39
Collective agreement, firm level -0,11 0,08 -0,04 0,09 -0,16 * 0,09
Labor intensity -0,43 * 0,24 -0,38 0,25 0,51 ** 0,26
Manufacturing ref. ref. ref.
Trade -0,36 0,26 0,00 0,00 0,18 0,24
Business services 0,07 0,12 -0,01 ** 0,00 0,28 ** 0,12
Personal services -0,04 *** 0,00 -0,66 *** 0,24 0,73 0,65
Margin adjustment equation
Fierce competition ref. ref. ref.
Strong competition -0,25 ** 0,12 -0,11 0,12 -0,24 ** 0,12
Weak competition -0,70 *** 0,13 -0,58 *** 0,12 -0,74 *** 0,13
No competition -1,20 *** 0,22 -0,57 *** 0,22 -1,04 *** 0,23
Collective agreement, industry level 0,23 0,33 -0,57 0,36 -0,30 0,35
Collective agreement, firm level -0,08 0,08 0,03 0,08 -0,06 0,09
Labor intensity 0,23 0,24 0,37 0,24 0,30 0,25
Manufacturing ref. ref. ref.
Trade 0,17 0,25 -0,03 0,24 0,05 0,24
Business services 0,01 0,12 -0,17 0,12 -0,23 * 0,12
Personal services -0,04 *** 0,00 -0,05 *** 0,00 -0,05 *** 0,01
Output adjustment equation
Fierce competition ref. ref. ref.
Strong competition 0,10 0,12 -0,20 0,15 0,07 0,13
Weak competition 0,29 ** 0,13 -0,06 0,15 -0,07 0,13
No competition 0,63 *** 0,20 -0,68 ** 0,35 -0,25 0,22
Collective agreement, industry level 0,05 0,33 -0,19 0,43 0,97 ** 0,41
Collective agreement, firm level 0,05 0,09 -0,11 0,10 0,05 0,09
Labor intensity -0,30 0,24 0,51 * 0,30 -0,46 * 0,25
Manufacturing ref. ref. ref.
Trade -0,06 0,29 0,19 0,31 0,34 0,29
Business services -0,41 *** 0,12 -0,27 * 0,15 -0,41 *** 0,12
Personal services 0,04 *** 0,00 -0,04 *** 0,00 0,00 0,59
Cost adjustment equation
Fierce competition ref. ref. ref.
Strong competition 0,05 0,13 0,09 0,13 -0,20 0,14
Weak competition 0,11 0,14 -0,04 0,13 -0,06 0,15
No competition -0,08 0,22 -0,34 0,21 0,01 0,27
Collective agreement, industry level 0,48 0,32 0,33 0,35 -0,57 0,42
Collective agreement, firm level 0,04 0,09 0,01 0,09 -0,02 0,11
Labor intensity -0,39 0,26 -0,15 0,25 -0,43 0,31
Manufacturing ref. ref. ref.
Trade 0,13 0,29 0,26 0,29 -0,18 0,33
Business services 0,19 *** 0,12 -0,28 *** 0,12 -0,33 ** 0,15
Personal services 0,37 *** 0,27 0,66 *** 0,27 -0,04 *** 0,00
Not reported : sector size area dummies, constant, export share
Observations 1309 1352 1116
Log-likelihood -2951 -3002 -2487
rho21 0,47 *** 0,03 -0,12 *** 0,04 -0,08 ** 0,04
rho31 -0,13 *** 0,04 -0,01 0,05 0,00 0,04
rho41 -0,06 0,04 0,01 0,04 0,10 *** 0,05
rho32 -0,12 *** 0,04 0,21 *** 0,05 0,17 *** 0,04
rho42 -0,01 0,04 0,11 *** 0,04 0,06 0,05
rho43 0,11 *** 0,04 0,14 *** 0,04 0,16 *** 0,05
Demand shock
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Firms 
in the initial  Respondents Response  Employees
 sample rate
Sector
Manufacturing 3 816 1 295 33.9 374 612
Trade 262 63 24.0 4 976
Market services 2 394 653 27.3 116 771
Non-market services 73 18 24.7 975
Size
0-19 employees 1 257 281 22.4 2 500
20-49 employees 1 236 396 32.0 11 510
50-199 employees 2 192 764 34.9 71 908
>200 employees 1 860 588 31.6 411 416
Geographical area
Paris area 772 178 23.1 69 824
North East 1 795 589 32.8 135 436
North West 1 428 431 30.2 104 949
South East 1 529 454 29.7 97 644
South West 1 021 377 36.9 89 481
Total 6 545 2 029 31.0 497 334
Table A -  The sample47
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